Canonical Voices

Posts tagged with 'bugs'

Colin Ian King

Finding small bugs

Over the past few months I've been using static code analysis tools such as cppcheck, Coverity Scan and also smatch on various open source projects.   I've generally found that most open source code is fairly well written, however, most suffer a common pattern of bugs on the error handling paths.  Typically, these are not free'ing up memory or freeing up memory incorrectly.  Other frequent bugs are not initialising variables and overly complex code paths that introduce subtle bugs when certain rare conditions are occur.  Most of these bugs are small and very rarely hit; some of these just silently do things wrong while others can potentially trigger segmentation faults.

The --force option in cppcheck to force the checking of every build configuration has been very useful in finding code paths that are rarely built, executed or tested and hence are likely to contain bugs.

I'm coming to the conclusion that whenever I have to look at some new code I should take 5 minutes or so throwing it at various static code analysis tools to see what pops out and being a good citizen and fixing these and sending these upstream. It's not too much effort and helps reduce some of those more obscure bugs that rarely bite but do linger around in code.

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Curtis Hovey

Launchpad’s bug and branch privacy features were replaced by information sharing that permits project maintainers to share kinds of confidential information with people at the project level. No one needs to manage bug and branch subscriptions to ensure trusted users have access to confidential information.

The Disclosure features

Disclosure is a super feature composed on many features that will allow commercial projects to work in private. Untrusted users cannot see the project’s data. Project maintainers can share their project with trusted users to reveal all or just some of the project’s data. The ultimate goal is to create private project in Launchpad, but that feature required several other features to be completed first. The Purple squad worked on Trusted Pickers, Privacy Transitions, Hardened Projects, Social Private Teams, and Sharing.

There was a lot of overlap between each feature the Purple squad worked on. Though we could start each feature independent of one another, we could only complete about 90% of each. When the Sharing UI changes entered beta, we were unblocked and fixes about most of the remaining issues, but fixing all the issues required all projects to switch to Sharing.   We did not consider Sharing, or any of the required features complete until we fixed all the bugs.

Disclosure facts

  • Planning started in June 2010 to replace the existing privacy mechanisms with something that would scale.
  • Early testing revealed that users did not trust Launchpad because the UI could not explain what was confidential, or what the consequences of a change would be — this needed to be fixed too.
  • 149 related bugs were identified in Launchpad.
  • Work started in June 2011 by the Purple squad.
  • Replacing the old privacy mechanisms and addressing the trust and information issues took 16 months.
  • About 45,000 lines code were added to support the features.
  • About 15% of the lines were for missing JavaScript test coverage.
  • More that 700 bugs were fixed in total.
  • About 5% of the fixed bugs were caused by the old non-scaling privacy mechanisms.
  • About 4% of the fixed bugs were caused by old JavaScript enhancements that broke features for non-JavaScript users.

Lessons learned

  • Misrepresentation of what is confidential, or what will be confidential or public is very important to users — more important than supporting private data.
  • Privacy/Sharing must be a first-class mechanism beneath all the mechanisms that work with confidential data.
    • Privacy was added on top of bugs, and it failed to scale to 100′s of bugs.
    • Privacy was added on top of branches, and it failed to scale to 1000′s of branches.
    • Filtering private items in code, or in database joins is not fast enough to work with 100,000′s of items.
  • Launchpad’s ReSTful object API is not suitable for working with large collections of objects like bugs or branches; a lighter, service-based approach was used to quickly work with large amounts of data.
  • Users need to work with confidential data via the API, using a text web browser from servers, using a browser with accessibility tools, as well as the common case of using a JavaScript enabled browser.
  • Lots of mock-ups and interactive tests will not predict all the interactions a user will have with real data; test with real code and data early to developer the final design.

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pitti

I just released Apport 2.5 with a bunch of new features and some bug fixes.

By default you cannot report bugs and crashes to packages from PPAs, as they are not Ubuntu packages. Some packages like Unity or UbuntuOne define their own crash database which reports bugs against the project instead. This has been a bit cumbersome in the past, as these packages needed to ship a /etc/apport/crashdb.conf.d/ snippet. This has become much easier, package hooks can define a new crash database directly now (#551330):

def add_info(report, ui):
   if determine_whether_to_report_to_upstream:
       report['CrashDB'] = '{ "impl": "launchpad", "project": "picsaw" }'

(Documented in package-hooks.txt)

Apport now also looks for package hooks in /opt (#1020503) if the executable path or a file in the package is somewhere below /opt (it tries all intermediate directories).

With these two, we should have much better support for filing bugs against ARB packages.

This version also finally drops the usage of gksu and moves to PolicyKit. Now we only have one package left in the default install (update-notifier) which uses it. Almost there!

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Colin Ian King

Testing eCryptfs

Over the past several months I've been occasionally back-porting a bunch of eCryptfs patches onto older Ubuntu releases.  Each back-ported fix needs to be properly sanity checked and so I've been writing test cases for each one and adding them to the eCryptfs test suite.

To get hold of the test suite, check it out using bzr:

 bzr checkout lp:ecryptfs  
and install the dependencies so one can build the test suite:
 sudo apt-get install debhelper autotools-dev autoconf automake \
intltool libtool libgcrypt11-dev libglib2.0-dev libkeyutils-dev \
libnss3-dev libpam0g-dev pkg-config python-dev swig acl \
ecryptfs-utils
If you want to test eCrytpfs with xfs and btrfs as the lower file system onto which eCryptfs is mounted, then one needs to also install the tools for these:
 sudo apt-get install xfsprogs btrfs-tools  
And then build the test programs:
 cd ecryptfs  
autoreconf -ivf
intltoolize -c -f
./configure --enable-tests --disable-pywrap
make
To run the tests, one needs to create lower and upper mount points. The tests allow one to create ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs or btrfs loop-back mounted file systems on the lower mount point, and then eCryptfs is mounted on the upper mount point on top.   To create these, use something like:
 sudo mkdir /lower /upper  
The loop-back file system image needs to be placed somewhere too, I generally place mine in a directory /tmp/image, so this needs creating too:
 mkdir /tmp/image  
There are two categories of tests, "safe" and "destructive".  Safe tests should run in such a ways as to not lock up the machine.  Destructive tests try hard to force bugs that can cause kernel oopses or panics. One specifies the test category with the -c option.  Now to run the tests, use:
 sudo ./tests/run_tests.sh -K -c safe -b 1000000 -D /tmp/image -l /lower -u /upper  
The -K option tells the test suite to run the kernel specific tests. These are the ones I am generally interested in since I'm testing kernel patches.

The -b option specifies the size in 1K blocks of the loop-back mounted /lower file system size.  I generally use 1000000 blocks as a minimum.

The -D option specifies the path where the temporary loop-back mounted image is kept and the -l and -u options specified the paths of the lower and upper mount points.

By default the tests will use an ext4 lower filesystem. One can also run specify which file systems to run the tests on using the -f option, this can be a comma separated list of one or more file systems, for example:
 sudo ./tests/run_tests.sh -K -c safe -b 1000000 -D /tmp/image -l /lower -u /upper \
-f ext2,ext3,ext4,xfs
And also, instead of running a bunch of tests, one can just a particular test using the -t option:
 sudo ./tests/run_tests.sh -K -c safe -b 1000000 -D /tmp/image -l /lower -u /upper \
-f ext2,ext3,ext4,xfs -t lp-926292.sh
..which tests the fix for LaunchPad bug 926292
 
We also run these tests regularly on new kernel images to ensure we don't introduce and regressions.   As it stands, I'm currently adding in tests for each bug fix that we back-port and for most new bugs that require a thorough test. I hope to expand the breadth of the tests to ensure we get better general test coverage.

And finally, thanks to Tyler Hicks for writing the test framework and for his valuable help in describing how to construct a bunch of these tests.

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pitti

I started to collect some easy PyGObject bugs which are appropriate for the PyGObject hackfest at GUADEC on July 30th. These are bugs which do not need a lot of previous knowlege and are excellent starters for new contributors, such as adding overrides, fixing build system issues, etc.

I also created an initial idea pool/agenda/coordination page, where participants can add or signup for things to work on.

Feel free to add your own topics! I’m really looking forward to GUADEC and the hackfest, see you there!

GUADEC 2012

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Curtis Hovey

Project maintainers can now see all the private bugs in their project. While Launchpad tried to ensure the proper people could see private bugs in the past, the old subscription mechanism was brittle. Users could unsubscribe themselves and lose access, or retarget a bug to another projects which does not update bug subscriptions. The Purple squad migrated project configurations to project sharing so that all private information was shared with project maintainers. Project sharing ensures that confidential information is disclosed to the proper people.

If you are a project maintainer, you might be surprised to find old private bugs that you have never seen before. This happened to me. Some ancient private bugs were in the “New” listing of bugs, other were buried in search results. You can search for just private bugs to review all private bugs.

advanced search for private information types

Privacy terminology is restored

We reverted the information type terminology changes introduced a few months ago.

  • User data ? Private
  • Embargoed Security ? Private Security
  • Unembargoed Security ? Public Security

While the jargon-laden terms helped the small number of people who work with confidential information, the people who report bugs were confused. The most common reason for unwanted disclosure is that people enter confidential information, and cannot see how to make it private. Sometimes a user may not notice the mistake until a few minutes later. We also revised the descriptions of the information types to help new users quickly select the correct information type.

change information type

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Curtis Hovey

You can now hide your own bug and question comments. If you want to hide a comment made in error, you can use the “Hide comment” action.

hide your comment

You can see it, and even unhide it if you choose. The project’s maintainer or the trusted people delegated to work with private information can still see your comment.

your hidden comment

This allows you, or the people the project shares private information with, to hide just the comments that contain personal information. The bug does not need to be made private if the comment can be hidden. Project maintainers can also hide comments because they contain spam or abuse.

 

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Curtis Hovey

The Purple squad recently updated bug reporting and searching to understand the new privacy rules. Some of the changes were requirements to support sharing, others were opportunities we took advantage of.

Improvements to bug reporting and forms

The Purple squad updated the bug reporting UI to make it consistent with the bug pages. We choose to develop one consistent and tested UI rather than update the many kinds of widgets used in bug forms.

  • Project maintainers, drivers, and bug supervisors can report private bugs.
  • Autocomplete works with bug tags
  • The status and importance controls show their definitions.
  • Undecided is the first importance because it is the default importance.

Improvements to bug searching

Advanced bug search was updated after we discovered that recent changes made it possible fix some long standing issues with a few additional lines of code.

  • Anyone can search for Private or Embargoed Security bugs that are shared with them.
  • Autocomplete works with bug tags.

Usability and Accessibility fixes

We discovered that the popups that show bug status, importance and information type did not work with keyboards. It was possible to tab out of every other kind of popup by accident. We made deep fixes to the code so that all launchpad popups work with keyboard.

  • You can use the tab key to move between the items in popups.
  • You cannot accidentally tab out of any popup.

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pitti

I just received confirmation that my request for a PyGObject hackfest has been approved by the GUADEC organizers.

If you are developing GObject-introspection based Python applications and have some problems with PyGObject, this is the time and place to get to know each other, getting bugs fixed, learn about pygobject’s innards, or update libraries to become introspectable. I will prepare a list of easy things to look into if you are interested in learning about and getting involved in PyGObject’s development.

See you on July 30th in A Coruña!

GUADEC Badge

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Curtis Hovey

Bug and branch information types

All users can now see the information type section that replaces the privacy and security section shown on bug and branch pages. This change allows users to clearly state the kind of information a bug or branch contains. Launchpad will soon permit project maintainers to share information types instead of managing individual bug and branch subscriptions. Project maintainers can see a link on their project’s front page to the  ”Sharing” page. Sharing lists all the users and teams their project shares some private bugs and branches with. This list might be surprising. Launchpad Beta testers will soon be able share and unshare kinds of information to simplify management of whom the project discloses private information to.

See Reimaging the nature of privacy in Launchpad for more details.

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Curtis Hovey

Project roles and notification after sharing

The Purple Squad recently discussed how the forthcoming sharing feature changes project setup. Sharing will allow project maintainers to share kinds of information with users and team. This feature separates access to private information from bug and branch subscriptions. Maintainers do not need to manage hundreds of subscriptions, users do not needs to block unwanted email.

Before sharing, direct subscriptions were the only way Launchpad knew which users the bug or branch was disclosed to. Launchpad would subscribe the maintainer, or the team in a designated role to ensure someone could work with the information in the bug or branch.  The subscribed users would then be responsible for subscribing other users and team so that everyone who needs to know about the information could work with it. Most users subscribed to private bugs and branches get unsolicited email. Each user’s project, series, and milestone subscriptions are ignored.

After sharing, subscriptions to projects, series, and milestones will just work. If a private bug matches your project subscriptions, and that kind of information is shared with you, you will get the email. You will be able to subscribe to kinds of information, such as embargoed security.

The security contact role

The security contact role is obsoleted by sharing. It can be removed.

The security contact exists to tell Launchpad which team to subscribe to embargoed security bugs to ensure the information is disclosed to someone. The role does not convey any other privileges. Only one team could be in the role; it was not possible to tell Launchpad that embargoed security bugs should be disclosed to several teams. Sharing allows the maintainer to specify which teams embargoed security information is disclosed to.

The bug listing page implies that no one has access to security information when the role is not set. This was never the case. Launchpad subscribed the maintainer to the bug if no one was in the security contact role. Maybe Launchpad should show a notice to maintainers when it detects that no one is subscribed to get security mail? This presumes email is how users want to be notified. It think this is nice to have, but not a requirement. I would prefer Launchpad to present a log of recent activity on its pages and send me emails that summarise important activity when I have not visited the pages recently.

The bug supervisor role

The bug supervisor  looses its private bug responsibilities after sharing. It is still useful to delegated additional bug editing privileges to a team who does not drive development decisions.

The bug supervisor role will be used less often. Most teams currently in the bug supervisor role are also in the driver or maintainer role. Launchpad required maintainers to set the bug supervisor role to ensure that those that plan released can also see the private bugs. Small projects will not need the role. It will only be needed by projects that want to expand the number of contributor who can triage bugs without expanding the number of people who do release management.

The maintainer role

The maintainer role is unchanged by sharing. Well, it responsibilities are unchanged, so we must ensure that the project shares private information with the maintainer by default.

When a project is registered, Launchpad must share each kind of private information with the maintainer. This is rule is not as simple as you might think. Many projects are registered by a user, who sets a team as the maintainer during setup. From Launchpad’s perspective,  the project has transferred the role. Launchpad does not know what to do [1]. Some maintainers do not want to work with private information, they delegate to other teams. Launchpad cannot presume that changing the maintainer means changing who private information is disclosed to. Maintainers can always choose to share the information with themselves.

Launchpad’s project setup workflow is incomplete. There are two screens that gather the basic information, but you can set additional information on the project front page. There are five pages to configure how the project uses Launchpad that maintainers should review during setup, but we did not have the time integrate them. We do not want users to do more work. Instead we want Launchpad to present just the essential information and have sensible defaults.

Reimaging/completing project setup is out of scope for the sharing feature, but it might be in scope for the Purple Squads next feature, private projects. During setup, Launchpad needs to know who the maintainer will be and share private information with them. We can consider this work as an enhancement to maintain expected behaviour. We will do this work as a part of the sharing feature. When we work on private projects, we can explore what else project setup and reconfigure needs to do to ensure that information is disclosed to the proper teams. Private projects will also entail making projects public, which means reconfiguring the kinds of information a project has.

[1]  If you have ever changed the bug supervisor or security contact, you might know of the pain I am alluding to. Bang head against desk, scream at computer, weep, set aside a few weeks of your valuable time to update all bug subscriptions yourself so that the new team can do it’s job. This whole scenario is implicitly fixed by sharing since subscriptions are not used to manage access.

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Curtis Hovey

Bug Linking Part 2

Jewel bugs on a Gmelina arborea leaf

The Launchpad team is planning a new feature that will allow you to link bugs to each other and describe their relationship. The general idea is that you can say one bug depends of the fix of another. The goal is to make it clear where conversations to fix issues take place, who will do the work, and when the work can start.

I summarised the existing bug linking features and hacks previously. Now I want to explain the workflows and UI that Launchpad could support to create and explain relationships between bugs.

Managing bug relationships

Organisations and communities split issues into separate bugs when different people work at different times with different priorities to solve the bigger issue. Organisations and communities merge bugs when they want a single conversation to fix an issue that affects several projects at a single time. Explicit relationship between bugs (or the many projects listed on a single bug) would help projects organise work.

There are four general relationships that people try to describe when working to fix an issue. These relationship are either explicit, or implied when a bug affects multiple projects, or many bugs affect a single project. The relationship informs everyone about where the conversation to fix an issue happens, and the order of work to fix a group of issues.

  • Duplicate: Bug X is the same as bug Y. The primary conversation about fixing the bug happens on bug Y. A secondary conversation happen on bug X. The affected projects, their status and importance, of bug X are identical to Bug Y.
  • Dependency: Bug X depends on bug Y. Bug Y must be fixed before bug X can be fixed. The bugs have separate conversations, but each is informed of the other. Though the bugs have separate status and importance, there is some expectation that work proceeds from one bug to the next. As the bugs might affect different projects, the work to fix a bug may be done by different people. A project bug might depend on the fix in a library that is provided by another project. A bug in a distro series package might depend on the fix in an upstream project release. Dependency is implied when we see a bug that affects a distro package also affects the package’s upstream project.
  • Similarity: Bug X and bug Y are caused by similar implementations. Bug X and Y require separate fixes that can happen concurrently. The bugs might share a conversation to find a fix, but the work and conversation is more often independent. In some cases, the proper fix is to create one implementation that the similar bugs depend on to fix the issue. A project might have two bugs caused by a bad pattern repeated in the code, or a pattern in one project is also used by another project. Each location of the pattern needs fixing. Maybe the right fix is to have a single implementation instead of multiple implementations.
  • overlap: Fixing bug X  changes the scope of work to fix bug Y. These bugs have separate conversations, but the work to fix each issue needs coordination. Fixing one bug may make the other invalid, or make it more difficult to fix the other. Maybe these bugs need to be redefined so that they do not overlap? Maybe bug X can be fixed at the same time as bug Y? Maybe both bugs really depend on an unknown root cause…bug Z?

We might imagine the relationships like sets. The duplicate bug is a subset of the master bug. Two bugs intersect in the overlap relationship. Similarity is a superset of several bugs. The dependency relationship has a direction pointing from one bug to the next.

Managing separate conversations

People working with proprietary information create duplicate and or dependent bugs to manage separate conversations. The “Affect project”, “Affects distro”, and “Duplicate” action do not work because they either mix conversations, or loose status and importance. Users benefit when private conversations are split from public ones, but Launchpad does not help the user do this.

Launchpad will not permit projects to share the forthcoming “proprietary” bug information type. Proprietary information is given to one project in confidence; The project cannot share that information with another project. The ”Affects project”, “Affects distro” cannot add projects to the bug, so Launchpad must help users report a separate bugs.

When someone realises a private bug affects more than one project, Launchpad could help the user split the bug into separate bug reports to manage conversations and the order of work to fix the greater  issue. Instead of adding a project or distro to the bug, the user might want to choose the project to report the bug in, and be prompted to revise the bug summary and description so that private information is not disclosed. The new bug is commonly public. It is the master bug, this is where the public conversation happens. This practice benefits more than the user who reported the bug…there is a public place for all users to discuss the issue.

Users are less likely to report a duplicate bug when Launchpad can show the public bug in the list of similar bugs. The principal cause of bug 434733 is not commercial projects, bug non-commercial projects like Ubuntu that mark bugs as duplicates of private bugs without consideration that users want to be informed and participate in the conversation.

Duplicate bugs continue to have separate side conversations that often focus on release issues. The discussion of how to fix the issue happens on the master bug. Duplicate bugs also have wasteful conversations that can be answered by the master bug. There is always a risk of disclosure when the reporter of a private bug has to visit the public bug to learn information that is pertinent to the private bug.  The risk and inconvenience could be avoided by showing the important information on the duplicate bug — do not force users to change the context when working with private data.

We can substitute another relationship for “duplicate” in my case for separating discussions. When a fix for a bug is dependent on a one or more other bug fixes, there are several conversations with different people with different concerns. The same is true for bugs with similar or overlapping concerns. The only time conversations really need to be shared is to coordinate the timing or scope of the fixes.

While privacy is a primary reason to split conversations, splitting public conversations can benefit as well. The current UI that encourages a single conversation of ambiguously related downstream and upstream projects is a source of unwanted email. If I am only interested in the issues that affect my projects, do not make be get email for all the other projects.  Splitting conversations into several bugs within a project is also a legitimate means to solve large problems that require different developers to fix code at different times. Minimising the notifications to just the relevant information keeps users focused on the issues.

Linking existing bugs

The workflow to select and link bugs is untrusted. When marking a bug as a duplicate, or linking a bug to a branch, Launchpad asks me to provide the bug number (Launchpad Id), then the page updates and I learn the consequences. Did I type the right number? Did people get emails about irrelevant or confidential information?

I expect Launchpad to ask me to review the bug I am linking and ask me to continue or cancel. Launchpad has to show enough information to answer my question’s and gain my trust:

  • What is the bug’s summary?
  • What is bug’s information type — is it private?
  • Which projects does the bug affect?
  • What are the bug’s tags?
  • What is the bug’s description?

The presentation for bug listings provides most of this information. Launchpad could reuse the presentation (that I am already familiar with) when asking me to review the bug that matched the number I entered.

I imagine that if the action I am taking is specific, like marking a bug as a duplicate of another, Launchpad does not need to ask me about the relationship. In cases where the relationship is not implicit in the action, Launchpad must let me select the relationship between the bugs.

I know many users expect bug linking to work like selecting a user. They want to enter search criteria to see a listing of matches. The user might expand a match to see additional information. The user can select the bug, and maybe select the relationship to create the link. I am sceptical that this workflow would meet my needs. I often use advanced bug search to locate a bug; I cannot imagine offering advanced bug search in the small space to select a bug to link. The picker infrastructure that provides the workflows to select users and projects supports filters, which could be adapted to work with bug tags. I  doubt this will be very useful. Advanced bug search does not work well across multiple projects, and bug linking does and must work across projects. I think people will still needs to use advanced search to locate the bug that they want to link.

Presenting a summary of the bug relationships

When an issue is represented by several bugs, or a bug affects several projects, users need known how they relate to understand where and when someone needs to take action. Users often open many pages because Launchpad cannot summarise the relationships between several bugs. Users will also read through long comments to learn why a bug affects many projects.

When viewing a bug, the user needs to see a listing of related bugs (dependency, similarity, and overlap). The listing summarises the affected project, status, importance, assignee, and milestone.  Users might need to see bug tags, and badges for branches and patches. Maybe this is like the listing of bugs shown in bug search.

The affects table is a special bug listing. Does it need to be special? Users want to see the relationship between the items in the affects table. I want to know if the fix in a package depends on the fix in an upstream project. I am unsure how this could be done since there might be many relationships in the table. Maybe the many relationships, 3 or more affected project, packages, and series, will diminish when bug linking is available. We know that users unsubscribe when a bug affects many things because the conversation looses focus. When users can link bugs, there will be less needs to say a bug affects many things.

Privacy is a special case. A user can only see the relationship between two bugs if the user can see both bugs. When the listing contains private bugs, the presentation must call-out that they are seeing privileged information. Launchpad does not have a consistent way to show that part of a page contains private information.

  • The user profile page will show locks before email addresses.
  • Bug listings show a lock icon among other icons after the bug.
  • Branch listings and linked branches show the lock icon after the branch.

Launchpad must make it clear to the user to not discuss the private relationships in the bug’s conversation.

Duplicates are presented differently from other bugs because they are subordinate to the master bug. There are several problems with the current presentation of duplicate bugs.

  • Duplicate bugs show contradictory information in the affects table
  • Duplicate bugs may not show the master bug if it is private
  • Master bugs may show hundreds of duplicate bug numbers without summary or privacy information
  • Why do I need to see all the duplicate bug numbers on a master bug?

Users do not need to see a list of all the duplicate bugs on the master bug. The number of duplicates is more interesting that a listing of numbers. User care about the duplicates they reported because they might want a side conversation, maybe Launchpad should show the user a link to the bug he or she reported? A contributor might want to read the the conversations in the duplicates for new information, so Launchpad does need to show a list of duplicates when the user asks for it. The listing of duplicates must indicate which are private. Other data like status and importance are irrelevant because the master bug provides the this information.

When I view a duplicate bug page, Launchpad must make it clear that this bug is a duplicate. I need to see the master bug’s information: affected project, importance, status, milestone, and assignee. I am not sure if the user should see its own affects table; that information would only be important if the bug was unduplicated.

There is a problem if the master bug is private and the user does not have permission to see the master bug. The user cannot see the master bug exists. Launchpad could prevent duplicate master bugs from being private if the project can have public bugs. In the case of projects with default proprietary bugs, the master bug will always be private. When the reporter of the duplicate bug cannot get information, he, and the project contributors are forced to start side conversations. Is it possible to show some of the affects table from the master bug to answer some of the user’s questions? May I know the status and importance of the master bug? May I know the affected project if both bugs have the same affected project?

Conclusion

The Launchpad team will spend about 12 weeks creating the bug linking feature. The feature will emphasise the use cases needed to support two other features in development now, sharing and private projects. Proprietary data has less need for revising the bug affects table, though a unified presentation of linked bug and affects projects might need less effort to create.

The essential points about bug linking is that project needs to manage bug conversations to mange the disclosure of private information. Organisations split work into multiple bugs to mange conversations and organise work between different people. Launchpad could show and summarise the linked bugs so that contributors do not need to switch context to plan work.

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Curtis Hovey

Launchpad beta testers are seeing information types on bug reports. Launchpad replaced the private and security checkboxes with an information type chooser. The information types determine who may know about the bug.

When you report a bug, you can choose the information type that describes the bug’s content. The person who triages the bug may change the information type. Information types may also change as a part of a workflow, for example, a bug may start as Embargoed Security while the bug is being fixed, then the release manager can change the information type to Unembargoed Security after the release.

Testing in phases

In the first phase of this beta, Launchpad continues to share private information with bug supervisors and security contacts using bug subscriptions. The project maintainer may be managing hundreds of bug subscriptions to private bugs, and people are getting unwanted bug mail.

In the second phase of the beta, the project maintainer can share information types with people…the maintainer is only managing shares with a few teams and users and people are not getting unwanted bug mail.

Watch the video of information types and sharing to see the feature in use and hints of the future.

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Curtis Hovey

Launchpad beta testers will now see the descriptions of bug status and importance when making updates to the bug page. Launchpad pickers can now show the descriptions of the options you can choose.

Launchpad’s rules for defining a list of options you can choose have always required descriptions, but the only places you could see them were in some forms where they were listed as radio buttons. Bug status and importance where never shown as radio buttons, so their description were only know to people who read Launchpad’s source code. Users need to see the descriptions so that there is a common understanding of terms that allows us to collaborate.  The original bug importance descriptions were written in 2006 and only made sense for Ubuntu bugs. We revised the descriptions for the improved picker.

There has been a lot of confusion and disagreement about the meaning of bug statuses. Since users could not see the descriptions, we posted the definition on help.launchpad.net. Separating the status description from the status title did not end the confusion. We revised the descriptions for the improved picker, but I think we need to make more changes before showing this to everyone. The picker  appears to rely on colour to separate the choice title from description. Not all choices will have a special colour, and in the case of bug status there are two choices that appear to be the same grey as the description text:

The picker enhancements were made for the disclosure feature. We are changing the presentation of bug and branch privacy to work with the forthcoming project sharing enhancements. Early testing revealed that users need to know who will be permitted to see the private information when the bug is changed. This issue was similar to the long standing problem with bug status and importance. We decided to create a new picker that solved the old problem, that we could then reuse to solve the new problem.

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pitti

Apport and the retracer bot in the Canonical data center have provided server-side automatic closing of duplicate crash report bugs for quite a long time. As we have only kept Apport crash detection enabled in the development release, we got away with this as bugs usually did not get so many duplicates that they became unmanageable. Also, the number of duplicates provided a nice hint to how urgent and widespread a crash actually was.

However, it’s time to end that era and provide something better now:

  • This probably caused a lot of frustration when a reporter of the crash spent time, bandwidth, and creativity to upload the crash data and create a description for it, only to find that it got closed as a duplicate 20 minutes later.
  • Some highly visible crashes sometimes generated up to a hundred duplicates in Launchpad, which was prone to timeouts, and needless catch-up by the retracers.
  • We plan to have a real crash database soon, and eventually want to keep Apport enabled in stable releases. This will raise the number of duplicates that we get by several magnitudes.
  • For common crashes we had to write manual bug patterns to avoid getting even more duplicates.

So with the just released Apport 1.90 we introduce client-side duplicate checking. So from now, when you report a crash, you are likely to see “We already know about this” right away, without having to upload or type anything, and you will get directed to the bug page. You should mark yourself as affected and/or subscribe to the bug, both to get a notification when it gets fixed, and also to properly raise the “hotness” of the bug to bubble up to developer attention.

For the technically interested, this is how we detect duplicates for the “signal” crashes like SIGSEGV (as opposed to e. g. Python crashes, where we always have a fully symbolic stack trace):
As we cannot rely on symbolic stack traces, and do not want to force every user to download tons of debug symbols, Apport now falls back to generating a “crash address signature” which combines the absolute addresses of the (non-symbolic) stack trace and the /proc/pid/maps mapping to a stack of libraries and the relative offsets within those, which is stable under ASLR for a given set of dependency versions. As the offsets are specific to the architecture, we form the signature as combination of the executable name, the signal number, the architecture, and the offset list. For example, the i386 signature of bug looks like this:

/usr/bin/rhythmbox:11:i686:/usr/lib/libgstpbutils-0.10.so.0.24.0+c284:/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgobject-2.0.so.0.3000.0+3337a:/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgobject-2.0.so.0.3000.0+8e0

As library dependencies can change, we have more than one architecture, and the faulty function can be called from different entry points, there can be many address signatures for a bug, so the database maintains an N:1 mapping. In its current form the signatures are taken as-is, which is much more strict than it needs to be. Once this works in principle, we can refine the matching to also detect duplicates from different entry points by reducing the part that needs to match to the common prefix of several signatures which were proven to be a duplicate by the retracer (which gets a fully symbolic stack trace).

The retracer bots now exports the current duplicate/address signature database to http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-archive/apport-duplicates in an indexed text format from where Apport clients can quickly check whether a bug is known.

For the Launchpad crash database implementation we actually check if the bug is readable by the reporter, i. e. it is private and the reporter is in a subscribed team, or the bug is public; if not, we let him report the bug anyway and duplicate it later through the existing server-side retracer, so that the reporter has a chance of getting subscribed to the bug. We also let the bug be filed if the currently existing symbolic stack trace is bad (tagged as apport-failed-retrace) or if a developer wants a new symbolic stack trace with the current libraries (tagged as apport-request-retrace).

As this is a major new feature, I decided that it’s time to call this Apport 2.0. This is the first public beta towards it, thus called 1.90. With Apport’s test driven and agile development the version numbers do not mean much anyway (the retracer bots in the data center always just run trunk, for example), so this is as good time as any to reset the rather large “.26″ minor version that we are at right now.

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pitti

12.04: Testing FTW

I arrived back home in Augsburg, from last week’s Ubuntu Developer Summit in Orlando, FL. As this is a quality/LTS cycle, we pretty much already knew in advance what to do (bug fixing, bug fixing, some boot speed, and did I mention bug fixing?), but still we had many highly interesting and exciting sessions this time, not so much about what we are going to do, but how we are going to build 12.04.

So far our common practice has been to toss everything new into the development release until Feature Freeze and then try and clean up most of the fallout. Me and many other developers have always cried for having more time for fixing long-standing bugs and not introducing breakage in the first place. It seems that now with 12.04, Ubuntu/Canonical are actually getting serious about it.

(Any resemblance to that postcard from the Kennedy Space Center which I went to last Sunday is of course absolutely unintended and purely coincidental :-) ).

The mission statement is now to have working ISOs, stable ? development, and daily intra-development upgrades every day, quick and regular cleanup of uninstallable packages, component-mismatches, NBS etc., backed by a new “stable +1″ team backed by three people on a rotational shift.

QA team is now setting up daily automatic smoketesting of the installer and other packages which have tests. For the latter we’ll convert some packages to the DEP-8, the proposed format for running autopkgtest on (I’ll do udisks, postgresql-common, pygobject, apport, and jockey soon).

We’ll try do put uploads which might break something (like new libraries) to a staging area first, against which we can run test suites of reverse dependencies before it lands in the new release. As doing this on a large scale still requires infrastructure to be created, we’ll only exercise it for a few packages by uploading to precise-proposed first, but this has a high potential for extension.

We want to commit to fixing major breakage within 3 hours of development time, or otherwise revert the faulty package to the previous version (unless that aggravates problems, such as file conflicts).

Finally, for Canonical upstreams we are introducing “acceptance criteria”, which will hopefully significantly raise the quality and lower the regressions of each Unity etc. release.

So, the mission is clear. In practice we’ll probably have to make some real-life concessions, and Murphy’s law dictates that there still will be some breakage, but we can learn from that as we go.

Let’s build 12.04 LTS!

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pitti

On a rather calm ten-hour flight to Orlando I once again did some pygobject, udisks, and Apport hacking (It’s scary how productive one can be when not constantly being interrupted by IRC, email, etc). One more visible change amongst these was finally fixing a five year old five-digit bug to integrate apport-retrace into the GUI, now that it does not potentially wreck your installation any more.

If the apport-retrace package is installed, the crash detail dialog will show a new “Examine locally” button:

Apport crash detail dialog

After clicking this, you can choose what do do exactly:

Retrace action dialog

I know this dialog is not a beauty, as it’s implemented using the ui_question_choice() API which is used by package hooks. That makes it work for all available UIs (GTK, KDE, CLI), though, and can easily be extended to have more actions. And if you get this far and want to stack traces, you are used to looking at eye-bleeding gibberish anyway..

Presumably the most useful (and default) action is to download all the debug symbols, open a Terminal, and put you into a GDB session with all these, and the core dump loaded, so that you can poke around the crashed program state with all symbols available.

But you can also run gdb without downloading debug symbols, or just update the .crash report file with a fully symbolic stack trace.

This works just as well in apport-cli, but not yet in the KDE version: Someone needs to implement the equivalent of the apport-gtk implementation to apport-kde and kde/bugreport.ui, i. e. show an “Examine locally” button if self.can_examine_locally() is true, and add an appropriate ui_run_terminal() method (which should be fairly similar to the GTK one, just with Qt/KDEish terminal emulators). But as Kubuntu does not currently use Apport (and also because I didn’t have all the dependencies installed on my laptop) I did not yet do this. Please catch me on IRC/mail/merge proposal if you want to work on this. If you look at above commit, the changes to the GtkBuilder file look huge, but that’s only because I haven’t touched it for ages and the current Glade shuffled the elements quite a bit; it just adds the button to the dialog.

For now this is all sitting in trunk, I’ll do a new upstream release and Ubuntu precise upload soon.

Happy debugging!

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Martin Pool

We’ve recently deployed two features that make it easier to find bugs that you’re previously said affect you:

1: On your personal bugs page, there’s now an Affecting bugs that shows all these bugs.

2: On a project, distribution or source package bug listing page, there’s now a “Bugs affecting me” filter on the right (for example, bugs affecting you in the Launchpad product).

Counts of the number of affected users already help developers know which bugs are most urgent to fix, both directly and by feeding into Launchpad’s bug heat heuristic. With these changes, the “affects me” feature will also make it easier for you to keep an eye on these bugs, without having to subscribe to all mail from them.

screenshot of

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Martin Pool

If you use gmail, you should now be able to send commands to Launchpad without gpg-signing.

gmail puts a DKIM cryptographic signature on outgoing mail, which is a cryptographic signature that proves that the mail was sent by gmail and that it was sent by the purported user. We verify the signature on Launchpad and treat that mail as trusted which means, for example, that you can triage bugs over mail or vote on merge proposals. Previously you needed to GPG-sign the mail which is a bit of a hassle for gmail.

(DKIM is signed by the sending domain, not by the user, so it doesn’t inherently prove that the purported sender is the actual one. People could intentionally or unintentionally set up a server that allows intra-domain impersonation, and it’s reported to be easy to misconfigure DKIM signers so that this happens. (Consider a simple SMTP server that accepts, signs and forwards everything from 192.168/16 with no authentication.) However, in cases like gmail we can reasonably assume Google don’t allow one user to impersonate another. We can add other trusted domains on request.)

If you have gmail configured to use some other address as your From address it will still work, as long as you verify both your gmail address and your other address.

You can use email commands to interact with both bugs and code merge proposals. For instance when Launchpad sends you mail about a new bug, you can just reply

  status confirmed
  importance medium

Thanks for letting us know!

We do this using the pydkim library.

Note that you do need at least one leading space before the commands.

If you hit any bugs, let us know.

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pitti

The tool to reprocess an Apport crash report to produce a symbolic stack trace, apport-retrace, has been pretty hard to use on a developer system so far: It either installed the packages from the crash report, plus its debug symbol packages (“ddebs”) into the running system (which frequently caused problems like broken dependencies), or it required setting up a chroot and using apport-chroot with fakechroot and fakeroot.

I’m happy to announce that with Apport 1.22, which landed in Oneiric yesterday, this has now become much easier: In the default mode it just calls gdb on the report’s coredump, i. e. expects that all the necessary packages are already installed and will complain about the missing ones. But with the new --sandbox/-Smode, it will just create a temporary directory, download and unpack packages there, and run gdb with some magic options to consider that directory a “virtual root”. These options haven’t been available back when this stuff was written the first time, which is why it used to be so complicated with fakechroots, etc. Now this does not need any root privileges, chroot() calls, etc.

As it only downloads and installs the bare minimum, and does not involve any of the dpkg/apt overhead (maintainer scripts, etc.), it has also become quite a lot faster. That’s how the apport retracers were able to dig through a backlog of about a thousand bugs in just a couple of hours.

So now, if you locally want to retrace or investigate a crash, you can do

   $ apport-retrace -s -S system /var/crash/_usr_bin_gedit.1000.crash

to get the stack traces on stdout, or

   $ apport-retrace -g -S system /var/crash/_usr_bin_gedit.1000.crash

to be put into a gdb session.

If you do this regularly, it’s highly recommended to use a permanent cache dir, where apt can store its indexes and downloaded packages: Use -C ~/.cache/apport-retrace for this (or the long version --cache).

You can also use this to reprocess crashes for a different release than the one you are currently running, by creating a config directory with an appropriate apt sources.list.

The manpage has all the details. (Note that at the time of this writing, manpages.ubuntu.com still has the old version — use the local one instead.)

Enjoy, and let me know how this works for you!

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